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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: This paper depicts the use of social media for political campaign in Indonesia and Malaysia 
whilst especially aiming at investigating religious and political sentiment of Indonesian (young) voters (reflected in their 
Twitter accounts, especially the tweets and memes) that supported Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (hereafter Jokowi’s camp) 
and Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa camps (hereafter Prabowo’s camp) in the 2014 Presidential Election Indonesia. 
Methodology: This qualitative study is a discourse analysis that deploys the Hallidayean transitivity system, language 
evaluation theory as well as social semiotics. Using stratified purposeful sampling, the data (tweets and memes of two 
contest political camps – the Islamic(/st?) versus the Nationalist) were taken during the campaign days (4 June –5 July 
2014). 
Main Findings: In the Indonesian case, the (c)overt black campaign of both camps operates in the framework of the 
contestation as well as the synthesis of the nationalist/Islamic(/st?) strands. They are deployed to be rhymed in the brand 
resonance the both camps’ campaign team forged. As for Malaysian, the use of social media platforms by its young 
electorates did not guarantee the popularity gained by the (legislative) candidates, as they overlooked the people’s 
collective memories of the 1998 Reform Movement that resonated with Malaysian identity. 
Implicationof this study: As a preliminary part of multiyear research funded by Indonesia’s Ministry of Research, 
Technology and Higher Education, the findings become the textual foundation in producing the recommendation for 
public policy on the political campaign in social media (in this case the Twitter). Compared to other social media 
platforms, Twitter was chosen as it provides limited numbers of characters for its users (especially the two main camps – 
Jokowi’s versus Prabowo’s camps), not only to tweet but that more importantly also the tweets represent the perennial 
discursive contestation of the Islamic (-/st?) versus Nationalist strands to the current 2019 elections Indonesia. 
Novelty/Originality of this study: The (c)overt black campaign of both camps operates in the framework of the 
contestation as well as the synthesis of the nationalist/Islamic(/st?) strands. They are deployed to be rhymed in the brand 
resonance the campaign team forged. A similar contesting strategy is deployed, such as countering similar religious and 
political issues that represent the supporters/volunteers(read also: public) sentiment in the cyberwar (in the form of 
utterance and visual war). 
Keywords: Religious and Political Sentiment, The 2014 Presidential Election Indonesia, Discursive Contestation, 
Tweets, Memes, Transitivity System, The Language of Evaluation, Social Semiotics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of social media for the political campaign cannot be perceived as a new phenomenon in digital democracy. 
However, for Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s contexts, this can be arguably be seen as the pristine phenomenon where the 
use of social media, especially by their (young) electorates, amplified compared to the previous elections. For Malaysia, 
the 2013 General election (hereafter “the GE13”) had been perceived as the first social media election (Jaharudin, 2014; 
Sani, 2014) where the ruling government coalition (Barisan Nasional) met its derisory failure for its popular votes (Sani, 
2014).WhilstforIndonesia, not only does the political campaign in social media, in this case, the 2014 Presidential 
Election (hereafter “Pilpres 2014”), represent the freedom of (hate?) speech, but also an arena where the nationalist and 
Islamic(/st?) strands synthesize and contest. This paper depicts the different results in the social media deployment for 
political campaign in the 2013 Malaysia’s General Election and the 2014 Indonesia’s Presidential Election, whilst at the 
same time, it also focuses on the investigation of religious and political public sentiment (in this case the 
supporters/volunteers of the two presidential candidates’ camps – Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto) in the 2014 
Presidential election. This paper is organized discussing the review of the literature (the social media deployment in 
various countries), method, the result and discussion (religious and political public sentiment in Pilpres 2014 represented 
in tweets and memes of their respective supporters/volunteers) and conclusion. Previous related studies pertaining to the 
relevant aspects are integrated with a review of the literature section.  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Prior to discussing the social media deployment in the GE13 and Pilpres 2014, the discussion of the Janus face of the 
social media use for political campaign is imperative, as it illuminates not only how the social media has been employed 
in a positive lens, but also how social media has been deployed to meet manipulative ends. Although the voice of netizen 
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in social media represents the grassroots’ democracy (Sani, 2014; Purbo in Lim, 2017) the results of the social media 
deployment for political campaigns differed in several countries. For instance, Borondo, et.al (2012) found that social 
media (Twitter)was deployed as a measurement tool to predict the support of the electorates in the 2011 Spain. In 
alignment with this, Tumasjan, et.al (2011) found that the number of tweets could predict the success of the candidates 
in Germany, whilst in Italy, they were also be used as election outcome indicators (Caldarelli, Chessa, Pammolli, Pompa, 
Puliga, 2014). In addition to this, these ideal uses of social media in Lim’s note(2017) subsume into netizen 
participation, i.e. in forms of civic engagement and exchanges as well as political participation transformation. And at 
the same time, as Lim continues, the dark side of social media users not limited to surveillance, loss of privacy, and 
information debasement. Thompson (2011) also found that social media has been deployed as the medium to propagate 
radical movements, such as in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Lim (2017) also contends that the Brexit 
phenomenon in UK and Trump’s victory in 2016 U.S.A could also be perceived as the results of the social media’s dark 
face. 
The Social Media Deployment in The GE13 Malaysia 
As earlier mentioned, the use of social media for a political campaign in Malaysia’s GE13 and Indonesia’s Pilpres 2014 
produced different results. Jaharudin (2014) argued that the failure of Barisan Nasional (hereafter “BN”) in winning the 
heart of its young electorates stemmed from the fact that BN, which is led by Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, 
overlooked the electorates’ collective memories, i.e. Reformasi 1998 (the 1998 Reform) and Gabungan Pilihan Raya 
Bersih dan Adil(hereafter “BERSIH”). The young Malaysian netizen (read: 20-40 year-old-electorates) demanded 
political transformation in the proliferated forms that mirrored the 1998 Reform movements, i.e. open political debate, 
mass z mobilization, political campaign for government’s opposition. Jaharudin (2014) found that the young electorates 
(71%) preferred parties that represent public interest to religion (14%), certain groups (11%) whilst associated 
themselves as native Malaysian identity (54%), religious identity (33%) and certain groups identity(12%). This 
percentage substantially also reflects the political disposition of Malaysia’s young voters.  
However, as Jaharudin’s continues, although Najib Razak’s political campaign adopted today’s political/cultural trend in 
using social media, his maneuver could not be perceived successful as his policies have been merely seen populist and 
thus failed to solve the country’s basic problems, i.e. socioeconomic imbalance, human rights, university autonomy 
(Puyok, 2013). Sani (2014) also adds that BN cannot detach itself from “the issue of graft and abuse of power, such as in 
the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) scandal, National Feedlot Corporation (NFC) cow-and condominium fiasco, and the 
Scorpene submarine saga”. 
Nonetheless, this failure did not make BN lost its majority voters. It still won the hearts of 50.87% voters compared to its 
opposition (Pakatan Rakyat or PR) 47.38% (Sani, 2014) from a total of 13,268,002 registered voters (Jaharudin, 2014) 
or 13.3 million voters in Sani’s record. However, PR dominated the registered popular votes of young electorates, i.e. 
41.98% (Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, 2013). 
In alignment with Jaharudin and Sani, deploying interaction strength plot design to analyze the passive interactions on 
Facebook Page (FP) between the legislative candidates’ posts and the passive users (the ones who gave the emoticon 
“like”), Khairuddin &Rao (2017) found that in the 33 days of campaigning each legislative candidates of the GE13 
posted“on avarage164 posts, and managed to acquire on average 49,260 likes from the total of 8,348 posts with the total 
number of likes 2,512,248”. However, these numbers do not reflect the hypothetical correlation of measurement 
popularity, i.e. the more “likes” one gets in social media (in this case FP), the higher one’s chance of being elected. As 
Khairuddin &Rao continue, from the 17 active candidates on FP that posted more than 164 posts, four of them failed to 
win the election. At the same time, from 12 candidates that were successful in obtaining more than 49,260 likes, three of 
them also failed. Nonetheless, Khairuddin &Rao did not further qualify the comments posted or the political/cultural 
meaning behind the posts and the likes.  
The Social Media Deployment in the Pilpres 2014 Indonesia: the Contestation of Nationalist/Islamic(/st) Strands 
Nielsen Media Center recorded Indonesia had 83.7million of internet users (the urban middle-class society, Sen &Hill, 
(2007) in kominfo(2014). This number increased to 132.7 million in 2017 (Lim, 2017). Lim suggests us that when 
investigating the use of Internet for political campaign, we need to trace back to the 1999 Indonesia – the time when 
PKS (Prosperous Justice Party – Indonesia’s Islamist Party (Lim, 2017) or “moderate” Islamic party (Tomsa, 2012), or “ 
normalized” Islamic party (Bubalo, Fealy &Mason, 2008) deployed its Internet networking for political purposes. PKS’s 
massive network with university campuses, Islamic boarding schools, and mosques has arguably secured its place in the 
hearts of its loyalists. 
This paper does not intend to trace back to 1999 Indonesia, as the elaboration for this paper is seen unnecessary. 
However, in short, the trend of campaigning in the general elections in Indonesia since the time of its independence had 
been dominated by mass mobilization, then shifted to the saturated use of outdoor-advertising-campaigning, especially 
in the 2009 elections (Leiliyanti, 2013) and the amplification of social media campaigning (the 2014 up to now). The use 
of the Internet for the political campaign was amplified, especially in the 2012 Gubernatorial election in DKI Jakarta 
Province (contesting Fauzi Bowo’s camp, the incumbent, versus Joko Widodo’s). It is then accelerated in the 2014 
Presidential election, when two pairs of candidates: Prabowo Subianto (hereafter Prabowo)-Hatta Rajasa and Joko 
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Widodo (hereafter Jokowi)-Jusuf Kalla contested. This amplification arguably stemmed, especially from when Jokowi’s 
camp re-deployed its cyber army in the 2012 Gubernatorial of DKI Jakarta Province. No fixed number found pertaining 
to the number of Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s cyber army. Nugroho and Setia (2014) noted that there are 148 Jokowi’s 
volunteer network, whilst Arianto (2014) noted that the total number of Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s army is 1,248. 
Nugroho, Setia, and Arianto are parts of Jokowi’s cyber army. 
If we take a closer look on some of the candidates’s cyber army and their non-mainstream media, such as Jaringan 
Indonesia Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa, Blog Special Return, Sahabat Prabowo, Relawan Pendukung Prabowo, 
Relawan Kemenangan Prabowo Hatta, dan Relawan Pendukung Prabowo untuk NKRI 1, AllforOne, PKS Piyungan, 
inilah.com, SelamatkanIndonesia.com, PrabowoSubianto.info, PKS.or.id, PKSPiyungan.org, PKSNongsa.org, 
SuaraNews.com, Voa-Islam.com, Arrahmah.com, Obor Rakyat, DakwatTuna (sic.).com, Petikan.com, 
InfoIndonesiaKia.com, IntrikNews.com, AsatuNews.com, DetikIslam.com, Obor Rahmatan Lil Alamin, 
GenerasiOptimis.org, LaskarJokowi.com, Jokowi.id, BaraNews.com. (Leiliyanti, Irawaty &Diyantari, 2017), we can 
identify how these two camps polarised by synthesizing and contesting the nationalist and Islamic(/st?) strands. For 
instance, as Lim (2017) argued that the non-mainstream media that supported Ahok (Jokowi’s long-term ally and DKI 
Jakarta’s Vice Governor during Jokowi’s gubernatorial administration) “arrahmahnews.com (a spoof of arrahmah.com), 
voa-islamnews.com (a copy of voa-islam.com), and pkspuyengan.com (a spoof of the now-defunct pkspiyungan.com)”. 
This reinforces the image positioning of Prabowo’s camp ((ultra)nationalist/nonauthoritarian Muslim candidates) and 
Jokowi’s camp (Nationalist Muslim candidates), (Mietzner, 2014, 2015, 2016; Fealy, 2016; Salamah, 2015; Woodward, 
2015; Djelantik, 2016; Hamayotsu, 2014; Njoto-Feillard, 2015; Subijanto, 2014; Roosa, 2014).  
Although both camps claimed themselves representing the nationalist strand, Prabowo’s camp is seen inclining to 
Islamisation agenda (or in Hefner’s term regimist Muslim) as Woodward (2015) argues that Prabowo is affiliated with 
Islamist hardliner, whilst Jokowi is framed as pious Muslim. Jokowi’s religious side had been questioned and criticized 
by his opponents, especially when he donned his umroh clothing, not an incorrect manner when conducting umroh a few 
days prior to the election. The donning arguably signified Jokowi’s overt demonstration of his Muslimness albeit the 
criticism. As for Prabowo, known as Suharto’s (Indonesia’s former (New Order regime) President) son-in-law, Prabowo 
is seen adopting the centralized passive patron-client politics along with his maneuver adopting Sukarno’s (the first 
Indonesia’s President) nationalist attributes, such as the safari suit, peci, the suffix “–keun”, during the campaign days. 
On the contrary, Jokowi represents the anti-thesis (Roosa, 2014; Subijanto, 2014; Tyson &Purnomo, 2016).  
Similar to Najib Razak’s political campaign, with the support of each camp’s supporters/volunteers, Jokowi won the 
election in derisory percentage(53.15% votes), whilst Prabowo 46.85%. In this light, adopting Lim’s (2017) argument 
the use of social media in political/cultural realm represents“algorithmic enclaves” in the post-truth politics (Taspell, 
2017), i.e. when the supporters/volunteers of each camp forgean imagined community where “shared identity online” is 
created by overturning the facts while glorifying the emotion to defend “their beliefs and protecting their resources from 
both real and perceived threats”. 
METHOD 
As part of multi-year research funded by the Indonesia’s Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education that 
focuses on analyzing tweets and memes of the supporters/volunteers of the 2014 Indonesia’s Presidential candidates as 
well as election regulations in order to produce recommendation for public policy on political campaign in social media, 
this paper limits itself to discussing one tweet and one meme of each camp as the samples. This is conducted to provide 
concise explication that exemplifies the mechanism of the contestation of the nationalist/Islamic strands on each camp. 
The data were randomly taken during the campaign days (4 June-5 July 2014).  
The analysis of tweets is typically conducted under quantitative research design (Khairuddin &Rao, 2017). However, 
this paper concentrates on textual analysis of the tweets and memes deploying the Hallidayean transitivity system, and 
language appraisal theory and social semiotics. Hallidayean transitivity system and language appraisal theory are 
deployed to examine the written expressions whilst social semiotics the memes. 
In the systemic functional linguistics realm, the Hallidayean transitivity system is used to scrutinize the representation 
system based on the clause level. The clause itself represents the flow of events or whats-going-on of the inner and outer 
experiences. There are six processes in the language system that represent the experiences: material process (action verb, 
representing outer experience), mental process (mental verb, representing inner experience), relational process (linking 
verb, representing the relation of inner and outer experiences), behavioral process (representing the amalgam of physical 
and mental activities, such as the verb “watch”), verbal process (saying verb), and existential process (signified by the 
word “there”). This postulation is then developed by Martin and White (2005) into language appraisal theory and by 
Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) into social semiotics.  
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Religious and Political Public Sentiment in Pilpres 2014 Tweets and Memes 
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Leiliyanti and Diyantari (2016) and Leiliyanti, Irawaty, and Diyantari (2017) found that the supporters/volunteers of 
each camp are trapped in the obscurity of negative/black campaigns. They cannot detach themselves from the complex 
matrix of power in which the nationalist/Islamic(/st?) strands synthesis and contest. 
Below exemplifies the complexity 
 
Figure 1: Tweet and meme 1 (Jokowi’s camp) 
Table 1: Details of Tweet and meme 1 (Jokowi’s camp) 
No. Conjunction Clause Ellipsis Process 
Type 
1.  @sahal_AS @BurhanMuhtadi @saiful_mujani 
@TomiLebang Kita laporkan Obor Rakyat,  
 Verbal 
2.  muncul lagi yg ini.  Relational 
3  Astaghfirullah >.    
The figure 1 & table 1 shows tweet “@sahal_AS @BurhanMuhtadi @saiful_mujani @TomiLebang Kita laporkan Obor 
Rakyat, muncul lagi yg ini. Astaghfirullah >.” above arguably adumbrates the rebound effect from the picture that entails 
the tweet, i.e. the picture of Jokowi along with a tabloid cover (presumably Obor Rakyat, a controversial tabloid that is 
according to Tyson and Purnomo (2016) that is allegedly associated with Prabowo’s camp) that Jokowi supports 
Christians and Chinese. Tyson and Purnomo (2016) position Obor Rakyat as part of the opponent camp’s black 
campaign that propagated three main issues: “Jokowi as bad Muslim; Jokowi as puppet president and Jokowi is closely 
associated with Chinese financiers”. However, their thesis argument, i.e. Obor Rakyat merely represents rumor politics 
and smear campaign, was built under the framework of documentary analysis, survey and interview, especially in 
Surakarta, Jokowi’s hometown, needs re-examination. From the references they deployed (such as, Sunny Tanuwidjaja, 
Ahok’s former staff that is now revealed to be the man behind the currently established political party, Partai Solidaritas 
Indonesia or Indonesia’s Solidarity Party), it is shown their messianic subjective pretension that fulsomely glorified 
Jokowi (read: Jokowi as Ratu Adil or (Javanese) Messiah). No linguistic examination on the tabloid articles is found. 
They merely attempted to examine the outcomes of the tabloid by conducting a survey and interview in Surakarta. The 
portion to balance the image glorification is also relatively small.  
Notwithstanding the fact, the Chinese and Christian association written on Obor Rakyat’s front cover has made the 
supporter of Jokowi furious (if not angry – that is reflected from the declarative mood of inviting the readers by 
deploying verbal process, i.e. reporting the tabloid (“kita laporkan Obor Rakyat” ([Let’s] report Obor Rakyat). The next 
clause (relational clause) “muncul lagi yang ini (this [the association] re-emerges)” signifies the reason behind the 
invitation, i.e. Jasmev’s (Jokowi’s cyber troop) justification for their invitation to make the readers file a report to the 
police. The reason is encapsulated in the deployment of euphemistic engagement to adduce the invitation. The account 
which tweeted, JASMEV 2014, mentioned Sahal-AS, BurhanMuhtadi, saiful_mujani, and TomiLebang, its allies. At this 
point, the act of displaying the cover and posting a pertinent tweet can be seen in two folds. It represents Jokowi camp’s 
counter-attack (if not response) to the opponent (as Jokowi’s camp perceives that such attempt not only leads to 
defamation but more importantly also overt black campaign). On the other side, as Tyson and Purnomo (2016) argue that 
the defamation and discredit potentially boost Jokowi’s positive image.    
At the end of their tweet, the Islamic expression “Astaghfirullah” which is used to ask for God’s forgiveness indicates 
they hope to overcome the (bad?) situation caused by Obor Rakyat, whilst overtly showing their Islamic credential. In 
this sense, this Islamic expression seems to be the linguistic tool to dilute their resentment. 
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Figure 2: Tweet and meme 2 (Jokowi’s camp) 
Table 2: Details of Tweet and meme 2 (Jokowi’s camp) 
No. Conjunction Clause Ellipsis Process 
Type 
1.  Bagaimana pendapat kakak kakak   relational 
2. Klo ada Capres sujud   material 
3.  nyembah makam seperti ini ya? :)   material 
The meme) above ((figure 2 & table 2) shows a person wearing peci did a ritual that does not comply with Islamic 
teaching. Without mentioning the name of the candidate (on the tweet) that is visually demonstrated bowing to a tomb, 
the picture visually informs us that the unmentioned-name candidate is Prabowo Subianto. JASMEV 2014 shared the 
meme and added a question asking the opinion of the readers pertinent to Prabowo’s act. Although the tweet is in the 
form of a question, it might (be used?) to lead people’s/voters’ opinion on the candidate. The statement was added with a 
smile that symbolizes/shows happiness (victory?). 
A closer examination shows that although the peci donning culturally associates with Muslimness as well as nationalist 
(Leiliyanti, 2013), the highlight lies in the act of bowing (the action verb “bowing” in the material clauses) the tomb. The 
action verbs “sujud” and “nyembah” in this context share similar meaning “bowing”. However, this two-time 
deployment of a similar action verb can be seen as an act of reinforcing the defamation (the two-time deployment avers 
the visual act of bowing)  
The meme was posted on June 14, later from the previous tweet—which was tweeted on June 7. The issue which was 
posted by JASMEV 2014 counters the tweet and meme that shows Jokowi supports Christians and Chinese. They deploy 
this issue related to religion to backfire the opponent. This is seen as imperative as the act of bowing makes Prabowo, 
who is framed closely associate himself as a pious Muslim, violates the Islamic teaching of bowing to a tomb in this 
case. 
 
Figure 3: Meme (Prabowo’s) 
Table 3: Detail of Meme (Prabowo’s) 
No. Conjunction Clause Ellipsis Process 
Type 
1.  Ngomong apa sih Jok?   Verbal 
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2.  E-Government  - 
3.  E-Budgeting  - 
4.  E gue culik juga lo lama-lama  Material 
The meme above (figure 3 & table 3) demonstrates the fragmentation of Prabowo’s face along with the written text 
“ngomong apa sih, jok..E-Government, E-Budgeting, E gue culik lo lama-lama (What did you say, Jok..E-Government, 
E-Budgeting, [E] I will later to kidnap you)”. The first statement is a question that is addressed to Jokowi (the meme 
uses informal addressing expression called “jok”). The question asked of what “Jok” had said that are e-government and 
e-budgeting followed by two-level dots that (probably) show there are other “E-s” that Jokowi mentioned. The last 
statement(it is more like a threat) says that “E gue culik juga lo lama-lama” or in English “I will later kidnap you”. Not 
only does this meme give the impression that Prabowo is the one who is going to do the aforementioned criminal act 
(kidnapping Jokowi?), but that it also reinforces the ossification of Prabowo’s negative stigma as the one who was 
allegedly behind the activist abduction in May 1998 riot (Leiliyanti, 2013). Jokowi’s political platforms, the E-
Government and E-Budgeting, were deployed as the bridge that linguistically rhymed with the punchline “E gue culik lo 
lama-lama”. The letter “E” is articulated with the long “a”, in which it does not carry any meaning instead of affirming 
the action (read: kidnapping/abducting). In this light, we argue that although the allegation of abducting the student 
activists is still disputable, his opponent also deployed a similar strategy (see the analysis of tweet 1) in propagating the 
(c)overt black campaign, targetting on the negative side(s) of the candidate. 
 
Figure 4: Tweet 3 (Prabowo’s camp) 
Table 4: Details of Tweet 3 (Prabowo’s camp) 
No. Conjunction Clause Ellipsis Process 
Type 
1.  Fadli Zon: e-budgeting Jokowi ternyata omong kosong 
merdeka.com/politik/fadli-...  
 Verbal 
2  e-budgeting Jokowi ternyata omong kosong  Relational 
The above tweet (figure 4 & table 4) was taken from the Fadli Zon twitter account. Fadli Zon is one of Prabowo’s 
campaign team, who later becomes Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives (2014-2019). His tweet criticized 
Jokowi’s program, i.e. e-budgeting, — the program that had been developed during Jokowi’s Gubernatorial 
administration. The noun “nonsense” is used as the attribute in identifying the e-budgeting program. No further pertinent 
explanation found, except the media link he used as a reference.  
If we relate this tweet with the previous meme, we will find that these two not only correlate (if not correspond) with 
each other but that they also can be seen as representing the reinforcement of negative stigma. When the previous meme 
was deployed to discredit Prabowo, the latter was employed to counter the opponent’s program. By this, in this context , 
the contestation operates by overturning the facts while glorifying the emotion as the resultant.   
 
Figure 5: Tweet 4 (Prabowo’s camp) 
Table 5: Tweet 4 (Prabowo’s camp) 
No. Conjunction Clause Ellipsis Process 
Type 
1.  @fadli zon boneka kok ikut debat capares   Material 
2.  ya, gg nyambung lah,  Relational 
3  pantesnya mainan cina   Relational 
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Fadli Zon’s tweet (figure 5 & table 5) mocks Jokowi as a “puppet presidential candidate”. Jokowi once again is 
attributed as a Chinese toy label. The highlight of this tweet not only lies on the puppet candidate, but more importantly 
also on the semantic domain of attitudes (represented by the words “kok”, “lah”, and “pantesnya(sic.)”). No linguistic 
parallel in English that has a similar association to these is found, probably expect for the word “pantesnya” or 
“properly”. The literal translation of this tweet will arguably be like “how come puppet presidential candidate 
participates in the presidential candidates’ debate”, “it doesn’t fit the frame”, “he’s properly Chinese toy”. The attitudes 
represented from the words “kok”, “lah”, and “pantesnya(sic.)” indicate the control of behavior and the taste 
management (Martin &White, 2005). In this sense, Fadli Zon’s linguistic attitudes demonstrate his behavioral control 
that represents his political disposition. The attitudes signify two folds: Zon’s linguistic illiteracy that the three-time 
deployment of the words shows Zon’s incompetency in articulating his political altercation. By this, he cannot control 
the rebound effect of his tweet in his camp and the opponents.  
The four linguistic examinations above indirectly represent the religious and political public sentiments towards the two 
contesting camps. Each camp’s tweets and memes attempted to visually and linguistically demonstrate the contestation 
as well as the synthesis of one’s political strands (the Islamic and the Nationalists) that resonate with the camps’ 
religious-political image. At the same time, this textual discursive contestation also shows how these shared identities 
online of the two camps ostensibly glorified more the emotion (read also: sentiments) of each camps’ 
supporters/volunteers rather than the facts contextualizing the texts. The evaluative lexis, such as “laporkan” ([let’s] 
report) and“muncul lagi yang ini”(this [the association] re-emerges) on tweet and meme1demonstrate the deployment of 
judgment of behavior (Martin&White, 2005) in “laporkan” ([let’s] report)”, whilst the latter indicates the engagement 
element, i.e. in form of playing voices and opinions as the latter statement indicated. As for tweet and meme 2, they 
indicate the supporters/volunteers’ act of instantiating the germination of questioning Prabowo’s Islamic credential 
(through the -sub-clause “[b]agaimana pendapat kakak kakak (sic)” or what do you think, sisters/brothers? I literally 
translate the word kakak-kakak into sisters/brothers, as in Indonesian context, especially in online discourse, those words 
are used to address the interlocutors in online platforms), i.e. his act of bowing the tomb (see: the meme. Prabowo was 
frequently perceived as affiliating himself with the plausible Islamic (/-st?) hardliners). The proceeding clause (“klo ada 
Capres sujud nyembah maka seperti ini ya?:)” or seeing the presidential candidate bow to the tomb-like this?:)) affirms 
the indirect act of assessing behavior to Islamic normative principle of forbidding such act. As for meme 3, though the 
first two noun phrases (E-Government, E-Budgeting) indicate Jokowi’s camp political programs, the punchline lies on 
the gallows humor, i.e. the third clause (E gue culik juga lo lama-lama). As earlier discussed that not only does this 
humor represent the ossification of Prabowo’s stigma, but that it also indicates the projection of Prabowo’s alleged act of 
abducting student’s activists during the 1998 May riot. The adverb “lama-lama” or “later” functions to amplify the 
graduation of such phenomenon (Prabowo as the mastermind of the abduction). As for tweet 4, it represents the way 
Fadli Zon, one of Prabowo’s closest allies, in countering the Jokowi’s camp attack. On this tweet, he did not provide one 
to one response (if not counter attack) to each opponent’s tweet attacks, but rather attacking Jokowi’s camp by 
perceiving the current Indonesian president as a political puppet during the 2014 presidential debate. 
By this, as implicitly indicated, this study limits itself to the discourse analysis (in this case on the textual level one) of 
the aforementioned tweets and memes for the Indonesian case. As for the Malaysian case, the comparative study merely 
concentrates on the findings from previous literature. They demonstrated different results (as previously discussed)from 
the use of social media platforms by the (young) electorates of these two neighboring countries. 
CONCLUSION 
As earlier mentioned, The use of social media in Malaysia (GE13) and Indonesia (Pilpres 2014) produced different 
results. Though the legislative and presidential candidates in Malaysia frequently posted on their social media platforms 
during the 33-day-campaign, they did not directly correlate with the level of popularity gained especially from the young 
electorates. This plausibly resulted from the act of overlooking the people’s collective memories of the 1998 Reform 
Movement and BERSIH. The public sentiments, especially the young ones in Malaysia, demonstrated that they preferred 
the political figure/party that could bring about the political transformation that instantiated the demands of the 1998 
Reform Movement which resonate with Malaysian identity. 
SUGGESTION 
As for the Indonesian case, the (c)overt black campaign of Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s camps operates in the framework of 
the contestation as well as the synthesis of the nationalist/Islamic(/st?) strands. They are deployed to be rhymed in the 
brand resonance the campaign team forged. A similar contesting strategy is deployed, such as countering similar 
religious and political issues that represent the supporters/volunteers (read also: public) sentiment in the cyberwar (in the 
form of utterance and visual war). The proposition of algorithmic enclave in the post-truth era seems to hold its 
credibility in this context.  
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD 
This research is limited to one case that occurred in social media for a political campaign in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
DueThere is a phenomenon in religious and political public sentiment towards the political campaign in social media. 
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IMPLICATION 
The findings become the textual foundation in producing the recommendation for public policy on the political 
campaign in social media (in this case the Twitter). Compared to other social media platforms, Twitter was chosen as it 
provides limited numbers of characters for its users (especially the two main camps – Jokowi’s versus Prabowo’s 
camps), not only to tweet but that more importantly also the tweets represent the perennial discursive contestation of the 
Islamic (-/st?) versus Nationalist strands to the current 2019 elections Indonesia 
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